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FOREWORD
This monograph examines the U.S.-India security relationship
and argues that signiﬁcant differences in their worldviews precludes
the development of a strong strategic relationship at present.
However, India’s continued economic and military growth, as well
as its ongoing commitment towards secularism and democracy,
makes it a future ally towards establishing strategic stability in Asia
and in assisting future nation-building efforts across the globe.
In the short run, therefore, the relationship should be based
on securing complementary interests: ensuring stability in the
Indian Ocean; democracy across the world; and getting the Indian
government to work proactively to prevent the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction and their associated systems.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY

Can India and the United States create a strategic partnership that
will further the security and foreign policy interests of both countries?
This monograph argues that given the divergent worldviews of the
two countries, it would be difﬁcult to develop a strategic partnership.
Further, the two countries differ about India’s nuclear status, with
the United States not in favor of making India into a de jure nuclear
weapons state. Indian analysts also remain concerned about the
reliability of the United States as a supplier of high technology, and
continued U.S. support to Pakistan is also seen as slowing down the
positive growth of the relationship.
The two countries do, however, have complementary interests,
and it is in American interests to facilitate the development of a strong
India that can play a role in ensuring strategic stability in Asia as
well as promoting shared values of democracy and secularism. One
needs to qualify this statement by saying that, given the self-imposed
limitations on India’s part, any such partnership would only evolve
in the long term. In the short term, U.S. interests partially are served
by having India work to secure multilateral security initiatives in
Asia, particularly in the Indian Ocean littoral.
From an American perspective, the following steps can be taken
to enhance the U.S.-India relationship and to make India play a more
proactive role in furthering U.S. international security interests.
First, the United States could further develop Indian educational
capabilities to provide higher technological and managerial
education to a growing number of students from West, Southwest,
and Central Asia. Second, the Indian Navy could be used to enforce
a broader maritime security framework in the Indian Ocean. Third,
India has the capacity to provide signiﬁcant numbers of troops
for peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and nation-building efforts.
Fourth, the United States should expect India to play a more proactive
role in nonproliferation issues. Fifth, Indian diplomatic assets can be
used to start a substantive dialogue with Iran. Sixth, the United States
must expect India to continue to develop its nuclear and conventional
military capability and use this capability, as Henry Kissinger has
v

suggested, to “prevent the rise of another dominant power to emerge
between Singapore and Aden. And this is compatible with American
interests.”1
For India to carry out such a role and emerge as a long-term
strategic partner, the United States has to reshape some of its own
policies to permit the rise of India to the status of a major power.
Reshaping American policies would speciﬁcally include:
• Supporting India’s quest to become a permanent member of
the United Nations Security Council.
• Reshaping international nonproliferation regimes to permit
India, Israel, and Pakistan to become de jure nuclear weapons
states.
• Eventually, recognizing the Line of Control in Kashmir
as the international border and, therefore, freezing the
territorial status quo in South Asia. This would help reduce
India-Pakistan tensions and permit India to play a greater
international role.
ENDNOTES
1. “Analysis. On the record: Dr. Henry Kissinger,” The Indian Express,
November 16, 2004.
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THE U.S.-INDIA RELATIONSHIP:
STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP
OR COMPLEMENTARY INTERESTS?
Introduction.
Can India and the United States create a strategic partnership
that will further the security and foreign policy interests of both
countries? Since the advent of the second Bush administration, there
has been a warming in relations between the two countries, with
increased military contacts and talk of technology transfers. Further,
the two countries share democratic values and are concerned about
the spread of terrorism in the broader Asian region. Economically,
India remains a large and relatively untapped market that would
be of interest to American multinationals. These ties have led to
some speculation about a potential U.S.-India security partnership
emerging.
This monograph argues, however, that given major differences
in the worldviews of the two countries, it would be difﬁcult to
develop a strategic partnership. The two countries do, however, have
complementary interests and, therefore, it is in American interests to
facilitate the development of a strong India. That country can then
play a role in ensuring strategic stability in Asia, as well as promote
American values of democracy and secularism (which India also
shares). One needs to qualify this statement by saying that, given the
self-imposed limitations on India’s part, any such partnership would
only evolve in the long term. In the short term, U.S. interests are
partially served by having India work to secure multilateral security
initiatives in Asia, particularly in the Indian Ocean littoral.
Background.
In the past, U.S.-Indian relations have been marked by divergent
worldviews that led both countries not to develop the type of relations
that the United States had with other major democracies, despite
several instances of overlapping security interests. Initial suspicions
about post-independence India stemmed from its unwillingness to
1

commit to the western alliance in the emerging Cold War, as well as
India’s adoption of a quasi-socialist economy. While the relationship
brieﬂy blossomed during and immediately after the Korean War with
India as a member of the United Nations (UN) armistice commission,
it soon ran aground with the twin crises of 1956—Hungary and Suez.
India condemned the Israel-French-British invasion of Suez but was
far more reluctant to condemn the Soviet Union’s brutal crushing
of the Hungarian revolt. Relations between the two countries again
brieﬂy ﬂourished after the Sino-Indian war of 1962 when the United
States transferred conventional weapons to India, discussed covering
India under its nuclear umbrella, and for a while was inclined to
set up intelligence posts in the country to monitor China. At the
economic level, India became a major recipient of U.S. assistance.
The United States provided signiﬁcant amounts of food aid to India
in the 1960s ﬁrst to tide over the country during the Bihar famine
and, later, to start an agricultural Green Revolution in the country.
Subsequent attempts to get India and Pakistan to negotiate a
settlement on the disputed state of Kashmir, however, made the
Indian government distance itself from the United States. At the same
time, growing Soviet problems with China led to a strengthening
of the India-Soviet Union relationship―particularly in the sphere of
military cooperation. The two countries signed a peace and friendship
treaty in August 1971 that allowed New Delhi greater diplomatic
and military freedom to counter Pakistan.
Difﬁcult relations with the United States continued in 1971
during the Bangladesh war. Indian ofﬁcials believe that the Nixon
administration sent an aircraft carrier, the U.S.S. Enterprise, into the
Bay of Bengal to put pressure on India to halt the military campaign
against Pakistan.1
The relationship remained cool in the 1970s both due to American
disinterest―the Vietnam war and events in the Middle East had
taken priority in U.S. foreign policy―and because India, in 1974,
decided to test a nuclear device. U.S. nonproliferation measures
automatically were implemented against India, and the 1974 test
led to a strengthening of both U.S. nonproliferation policies (with
the Glenn-Symington Amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act
and the 1978 Nuclear Nonproliferation Act) as well as those of other
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western suppliers―through the creation of the London Club in 1975
and the decision by Western nuclear suppliers to ask for “fullscope”
safeguard over any future technology transfers to other countries. At
the same time, the United States had decreasing interest in Pakistan
because it was no longer relevant as a frontline state in the Cold
War.
The situation of disinterest changed after the Soviet Union’s
invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. The United States, seeking to
contain Soviet expansion toward the Indian Ocean and the Persian
Gulf, decided to supply arms to Pakistan and to use Pakistani
territory as a conduit for supplying weapons to and for training the
Afghan Mujahideen. This was done even while it became apparent
that Pakistan had decided to follow India’s example and initiated
a nuclear weapons program. Although the personal relationship
between President Reagan and Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi
was cordial, and her son and successor, Rajiv Gandhi, was able to
garner considerable goodwill in the United States, the rationale
of the Cold War kept the two countries apart. It was also during
the Rajiv Gandhi period (1984-89) that the ﬁrst discussions about
transferring defense related technology began. India expressed an
interest in purchasing American avionics and powerplants for its
Light Combat Aircraft program.2
It was only after the end of the Cold War and the coming to power
of the Narasimha Rao government in India in 1991 that relations
began to improve. The new Indian government, recognizing that the
economy was in a crisis, sought to carry out a series of structural and
market reforms that relaxed previous obstacles to foreign investment
in the country and allowed the economy to be rejuvenated. Indian
and American groups began to meet to discuss defense cooperation,
especially the transfers of technologies to assist in the development
of India’s conventional weapons production programs. At the same
time, the ﬁrst Bush administration declared in 1990 that Pakistan
was not complying with the nonproliferation measures and cut off
military and economic assistance to Islamabad (the President could
not certify under the Pressler Amendment of 1985 that Pakistan did
not have a nuclear device).
The Clinton administration sought to improve relations further,
but the May 1998 nuclear tests by India and Pakistan led to
3

another series of sanctions being imposed on both countries. While
subsequent congressional amendments were to pull back most of the
economic sanctions, key ones remained, particularly in the area of
military technology transfers. India’s Light Combat Aircraft program
was delayed because of its inability to obtain General Electric F404 powerplants to power the prototypes. While sanctions led to a
cooling down of the relationship, the United States was proactive in
keeping the peace between the two nuclear neighbors.
After the nuclear tests of 1998, Deputy Secretary of State Strobe
Talbott conducted nine rounds of meetings with India’s then foreign
minister Jaswant Singh in an effort to reduce the dangers emanating
from both countries’ going overtly nuclear. The discussions led to a
shift in U.S. policy on nuclear issues in the region. The earlier position
of the Clinton administration was to “cap, reduce, and rollback” the
nuclear programs of both countries. This position changed, at least
in the short term, to one of urging India and Pakistan to keep their
nuclear forces nondeployed and at the lowest possible levels.3
The Clinton administration also made a signiﬁcant differentiation
between India, which it treated as a nuclear democracy, and other
proliferating states whom it ﬁrst labeled rogue states and later states
of concern. By treating India and Pakistan differently, it was able
to continue developing relations with the two countries―although
far more warmly with India than Pakistan―while seeking to limit
the damage caused by regional proliferation. At the same time the
Clinton administration successfully practiced international crisis
diplomacy in the region.
In 1999, during the Kargil crisis (which followed a Pakistani
advance into a remote, high altitude part of Kashmir on the Indian
side of the Line of Control), the United States was instrumental in
getting Pakistan to withdraw its troops from the Kargil and Drass
sectors of Indian Kashmir and in staving off a potential full-scale
nuclear conﬂict between the two countries. Former White House
staffer Bruce Riedel has written that President Clinton applied
pressure on the Nawaz Sharif government in Pakistan to back down,
and that the Pakistan military was thought to be readying its nuclear
warheads.4 The United States, however, did proceed to develop
bilateral linkages with India on issues of mutual interest―one such
forum being the Joint Commission of Counterterrorism.
4

The relationship took a turn for the better with the advent of the
second Bush administration which saw India as playing an important
role in future U.S. foreign policy towards Asia. As Secretary of State
Colin Powell put it in his conﬁrmation hearing:
We must deal wisely with the world’s largest democracy. Soon to be the
most populous country in the world, India has the potential to help keep
the peace in the vast Indian Ocean area and its periphery. We need to
work harder and more consistently to assist India in this endeavor, while
not neglecting our friends in Pakistan.5

Some have argued that this appraisal of India’s position came from
the administration’s stance that China was no longer just a major
trading partner but had become a strategic competitor that needed
to be contained in Asia. This proposed strategy gained further
credence after the April 2001 collision and forced landing of a Navy
PC-3 surveillance aircraft by the Chinese Air Force.
By mid-2001 it seemed that India and the United States were
building a new relationship that was based on military ties and an
increasingly similar worldview. Thus the Indian government was
one of the ﬁrst to endorse the Bush administration’s National Missile
Defense proposal, especially welcoming the fact that missile defense
would go hand-in-hand with deep cuts in U.S. nuclear arsenals.
There was also some degree of agreement between the two countries
on the limitations of the International Criminal Court, particularly
on the issue of peacekeepers. In addition, the two governments
decided to not criticize each other in public―moving away from a
policy that the Indians had followed in the Cold War days. Indian
concerns about the U.S. stand on the Kyoto treaty were conveyed
privately to the Bush administration. The administration, similarly,
muted its criticism of India’s test of a 700-kilometer medium range
Agni-1 missile in early 2002.6
The attacks of September 11, 2001, however, saw the United
States, much to India’s consternation, renew its security relationship
with Pakistan.7 India offered unconditional support to the United
States, including basing rights for carrying out an air campaign
over Afghanistan, but Pakistan’s proximity to Afghanistan made it
necessary for the United States to renew its alliance with Islamabad.
India’s concerns about terrorism were highlighted by the attack on
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the Indian parliament on December 13, 2001, which was viewed in
New Delhi as an attack carried out reportedly by the banned Lashkare-Taiba group at the behest of Pakistan’s InterServices Intelligence
(ISI).8 India mobilized its armed forces and placed them along the
border with Pakistan but decided not to pursue a military action,
following a U.S. undertaking to put pressure on President Musharraf
to halt cross-border inﬁltration. New Delhi remains dissatisﬁed with
these efforts because it argues that inﬁltration has not been totally
halted. Thus there has been talk among some analysts in India that
the U.S. ability to intervene successfully in South Asian crises is
declining, and that India in future crises will have to rely on itself to
address the problems posed by Pakistan-sponsored inﬁltration.9
After 1 year of exceptionally hostile relations between India and
Pakistan (with then Indian foreign minister Yashwant Sinha stating
that India had a much better case to go for preemption against Pakistan
than the United States had against Iraq),10 the Indian prime minister,
in April 2003, offered to talk to the Pakistani leadership in a third
and ﬁnal attempt to secure peace between the two countries (the ﬁrst
attempt was the Lahore summit of 1999, and the second, the Agra
summit of 2001). The Indian government set aside its precondition
that Pakistan halt all cross-border inﬁltration and Pakistan, in turn,
ratcheted up its demands for negotiations on the “core issue” of
Kashmir.
Since then India-Pakistan talks have taken a more positive turn
as both countries have conducted negotiations on a range of issues
including Kashmir. India has proposed a list of 72 conﬁdence-building
measures, and Pakistan has responded with its own set of proposals.
More importantly, the two countries agreed to a ceaseﬁre along
the Line of Control in Kashmir, which was extended in September
2004.
The U.S. role remains one of facilitating negotiations between the
two sides which has left the two countries somewhat dissatisﬁed.
India would like the United States to put more pressure on Islamabad
to halt cross-border inﬁltration, while Islamabad would like the
United States to act as an intermediary between the two countries―
carrying out the same role it fulﬁlls for Israel and Palestine. The
dissatisfaction with U.S. efforts is compounded because the two
countries have somewhat contradictory worldviews.
6

U.S. Worldview and India.
As the remaining superpower, the United States is in a unique
position in contemporary international relations. Not only does it
have military and technological superiority over its closest rivals,
but also is positioned to dictate political and diplomatic outcomes
in a way that it never has before. This was brought home during
the buildup to the Gulf War when the United States withdrew its
resolution in the UN Security Council and, with limited international
support, successfully carried out regime change in Iraq. The U.S.
strategic superiority is unlikely to fade away in the near future for
three reasons. First, American military superiority continues to grow
not only in terms of technological prowess but increasingly in terms
of training and tactics.
As Barry Posen has argued, America’s military supremacy rests
on its control of the commons―the deep seas, airspace over 15,000
feet, and outer space.11 While no nation has sovereignty over these
environments, a country must have control over them to prosecute
modern warfare successfully.
America has control over all three commons and is likely to retain
this advantage for some time because of its commitment to military
research and development (R&D) that provides it with a growing
technological edge over potential challengers (as Posen points out,
current U.S. R&D expenditure almost matches the combined defense
budgets of Germany and France).12 This capability is enhanced by
two additional factors: a world-wide network of bases that extend
the U.S. military reach; and the division of the world into a series
of commands that can work together effectively to prosecute U.S.
military strategy.13
This military capability can prevail over any standing military in
the world and permitted the second Bush administration to believe
that it would militarily prevail in Iraq, establish democracy there,
and set the template to bring about change in the Middle East.
While the United States has control over the commons, one
environment in which its military preponderance can be challenged
is the land environment. There, regular and irregular forces that have
sufﬁcient manpower, are motivated, and know the terrain will ﬁght
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American forces. As we have seen in Iraq, such forces, despite their
technological backwardness, have been able to exact a considerable
toll from the technologically superior and better-trained U.S. forces.
In short, technology does not successfully substitute for personnel
on the ground.
Having said that, the costs are high for a regime that opposes
U.S. interests. While the United States has had problems with regime
installation in Iraq, it easily succeeded in toppling Saddam Hussain’s
Baathist government. Any country opposing U.S. security interests,
therefore, runs the risk of having its regime overthrown unless it has
a high level of domestic legitimacy. In fact, this lack of legitimacy may
have made the Libyan government of Colonel Mohammar Qaddaﬁ
recognize its vulnerability and move to dismantle its Weapons of
Mass Destruction (WMD) programs and sue for peace with the
United States.
Second, the U.S. economy remains attractive enough for foreign
and domestic investors to continue to keep their investments.
Neither Europe nor Japan will be able to completely take over as
an economic alternative to the United States. While there has been
some discussion of how the United States suffers from an economic
deﬁcit,14 and this may lead to a pullout of funds from this country
to more lucrative foreign markets, the fact remains that the United
States continues to attract high levels of external investments, thus
making it possible to sustain its domestic and foreign policies.
The third factor that works in the favor of the United States is its
soft power, particularly its attractiveness to global intellectual labor.
Much has been written about the ﬂow of migrants from the developing
world into the West, but this has tended to focus on those working
in the lower economic spheres in western societies―the Mexicans
in the United States, the Turks in Germany, and North Africans in
Italy. Less discussed is the ﬂow of highly-skilled or intellectual labor
across boundaries, and the United States was the clear winner in this
process. Highly-skilled labor ﬂows in Europe tended to be between
European Union (EU) members or in the sporting arena―the global
ﬂow of soccer players into Europe.15 But the United States was able to
attract the best intellectual minds from around the world to work in
its universities and high-technology industries for several reasons.
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Europe, particularly Britain, had cut off ﬁnancial aid to foreign
students, making higher education in these countries unattractive to
prospective intellectual labor imports from the rest of the world. The
United States, in contrast, retained a vibrant university system that
actively recruited the best minds from around the world.
Racism and cultural intolerance also raised their ugly faces in the
1990s, thus reducing the attractiveness of Western Europe to highlyskilled professionals; the rise of le Pen in France, Haider in Austria,
Bossi in Italy, and neo-Nazis in Germany contributed to making
the EU the second choice for high-level professionals. Further, the
inability of these states to become truly multicultural and accepting
made it unlikely that they would be the best targets for anyone
seeking to emigrate. A case in point was the ﬂow of Hong Kong
Chinese to Canada and the United States rather than to England.
Finally, competing European ﬁrms and universities could not match
the much higher wages in the United States. These three inducements
have made the United States not just the military leader of the world
but also its economic and cultural leader.
America’s Security Agenda.
At the same time, however, the limits of American military
power and global leadership are also apparent. While the United
States has the military capability to intervene and prevail in any part
of the world, the more difﬁcult task is to stay in a country for an
extended time to carry out nation-building and the restoration of civil
society. The challenges faced in Iraq and Afghanistan with policing
the country, restoring civil order, and helping shape democratic
institutions point to the need to have forces willing to stay in country
for extended periods of time to create the needed civil situation.
The coalition of the willing in Iraq lacks enough countries with
the military experience to wage a counterinsurgency successfully.
Further, the traditional allies of the United States may not be the
best suited for carrying out peacekeeping and peace enforcement
operations in a non-Western setting. Thus, if the United States is to
counter charges of being an imperial power in the Middle East, it
will require non-Western states by its side in its military efforts. In
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his exasperation with Paris and Berlin, Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld may have labeled France and Germany “old Europe,” but,
in another way, he was closer to the truth. Using European countries
to establish peace only further fuels the allegations that a new kind
of imperialism is being imposed on the world.
The other central challenge for the United States is the need to
help create secular democracies around the world. While the events
of September 11, 2001, demonstrated the need for a proactive military
policy to target terrorism, it also brought home the realization that
the international system had to be moving in the direction of secular
democratic states. This became apparent in Central Asia where the
various authoritarian regimes were combating Islamic fundamentalist
groups. While the countries of Central Asia cannot be described as
democracies, their populations are both educated and relatively
secular. Helping to consolidate these trends, while strengthening the
role of democracy in the region, will not only combat radical Islam
there but also globally serve as a role model for modern Muslim
states. With both these issues, the United States may be able to get
support from India and develop a series of complementary interests,
particularly in the latter area of promoting democratic secularism.
A third important area for the United States is strategic stability
and the containment of China. Strategic stability in Asia is affected
by the proliferation of WMD, the spread of terrorism, and the rise
of China as a potential hegemonic power in the region. Of these, the
Indian role may be most inﬂuential in future attempts to constrain
China.
The Bush administration, unlike its predecessor, was to brand
China a strategic competitor,16 and there was some discussion on how
to contain it. China’s military modernization efforts, its territorial
dispute with Taiwan, its claims over the Paracel and Spratly Islands
(which are rich in energy reserves), and its policy on the transfers of
WMD and related delivery systems pose long-term concerns for the
United States.
In the aftermath of 9/11, some of these issues have been pushed
into the background, and a new level of cooperation has emerged
with China, particularly on the issue of Islamic terrorism. China
has worked with the United States on the global counterterrorism
effort, adopted stringent regulations on dual-use missile technology
10

exports and other proliferation issues, and facilitated the diplomatic
discussions between the United States and North Korea in April
2003. China’s concerns about radical Islamic groups helping foment
the insurgency in Xinjiang would also work to strengthen the ties
with the United States.
On the other hand, the post-September 11 presence of the United
States in Central Asia is viewed with concern in Beijing since it
puts the United States in another geographic location that encircles
China. China also remains as concerned about U.S. plans to carry
out a National Missile Defense program as it is about Washington’s
possible change of attitude to the reuniﬁcation of Taiwan with
China.
Further, the huge volume of trade with China has placed the
United States in a situation where it now depends on the cheap supply
of goods from China. Breaking away from a trading relationship that
is in excess of $180 billion will be difﬁcult for the United States to do
in a relatively short period of time. Yet if the United States at some
point is to attempt to put greater diplomatic and military pressure
on China, it may precisely have to achieve a lesser trade dependence
on that country.
The three challenges of nation-building, democratization, and
containing China will require money, manpower, and a new set of
alliance partners than those used traditionally by the United States.
India could be a useful partner in these endeavors, but it would
require recognizing the contradictions between the American and
Indian worldviews.
The Indian Worldview: The Reformist State.
Indian foreign policy is best understood by recognizing that the
country has assumed a somewhat unique position in international
affairs because its leadership has sought to make the country into a
reformist state. Typically, the international system is viewed as being
divided between status quo and revolutionary states. Status quo
states are those that seek to maintain the structure of the international
system and the order that ensues from it.
Revolutionary states seek to dismantle the structure and the order
that goes with it, partially or completely. Revolutionary states have
11

been described as rogue states, states of concern, and, more recently,
as the axis of evil. While one can question which states are placed
in this category, especially since the newer members lack the global
capacity to challenge the hegemonic power of the status quo states
(unlike the way the former Soviet Union and, to a lesser degree,
Mao’s China did during the Cold War), the fact remains that such a
category of states continues to exist.
India, on the other hand, is a reformist state―one that by and
large accepts the structure and order of the international system but
wishes to make incremental changes to it in order to improve its own
power potential and status within the international system. India’s
ﬁrst prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, envisaged such a position
for India when he suggested that, while India was a poor country,
it was a great country, and that it had a pivotal role to play in world
affairs. This role was to try and achieve the needs of world peace
and freedom that were not only part of the post-colonial revolution
occurring in the post-World War II world but also critical to India’s
internal development and national security objectives.17
As a reformist state, India has sought to participate in maintaining
the status quo in the international system while shaping it so that
New Delhi gets a greater say in world affairs. Thus India has been a
consistent supporter of the United Nations and participated in over
50 peacekeeping operations. But India’s objective remains to become
a permanent member of the UN Security Council. India has refused
to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, but at the same time the
Indian government has not assisted in the proliferation of nuclear
weaponry or its associated delivery systems―in the late 1980s, for
example, India refused to sell nuclear weapons to Libya.18 Similarly,
India has joined the Antarctic Club and is a Pioneer member of the Law
of the Seas treaty, thus signaling its commitment to international law
yet ensuring that it will inﬂuence decisionmaking in both bodies.
The second part of the Indian foreign policy, which is also an
evolutionary response to the shift in power within the international
system in the 1990s, is to seek a multipolar world (as deﬁned by Indian
policymakers, it is a quest to strengthen multilateral institutions).
During the Cold War, India, through the nonaligned movement,
sought to prevent the international system from becoming a tight
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bipolar system that put the countries of the world into two armed
camps. Now India, like other major actors in the international
system, would prefer to have a world order where the United States
was counterbalanced by a group of powers. Former Foreign Minister
Yashwant Sinha alluded to this, as well as to India’s international
ambitions, when he said:
We must also work to spread democracy at the national and also
international level. Sometimes the multilateral vocation of the United
States is forgotten. Almost all the signiﬁcant multilateral institutions
were created as a result of U.S. initiative. The United Nations, the World
Bank, the International Monetary Fund [IMF] and the GATT [General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] reincarnated now as the World Trade
Organization. They needed initial guidance. Now several decades after
their creation will require changes in their governance. We need to
readjust the structures of decisionmaking in international bodies to reﬂect
contemporary reality. We cannot hope to foster a democratic culture in
the world until the principal international institutions are themselves
democratized and made more representative.19

The India-Russia relationship could possibly serve as a basis
for future cooperation and for securing a multilateral international
order, but it is restricted by the internal weaknesses of Russia and
its diminished international stature. After the collapse of the Soviet
Union, Russia, as the successor state, sought to distance itself from
its traditional ally, India, and pursue a pro-Western policy. During
the premiership of Yevgeny Primakov, Russian interest in India was
revived, as the Russian premier proposed a strategic partnership
between India, China, and Russia.20 In 2000, India and Russia signed
the Declaration on Strategic Partnership but made it clear that it was
aimed exclusively at countering terrorism and extremism. Since
then, little has happened to suggest that India, China, and Russia
will form a strong alliance that could potentially counter the United
States. Russian Ambassador to India Alexander Kadakin has argued,
“Strategic partners means that we support each other in our joint
vision of the world. We are against a so-called unipolar world; we
stand for a multipolar world. We are for political cooperation, we are
against terrorism together.”21
India, however, has downplayed the idea of a strategic
partnership. At the same time, it has continued to buy signiﬁcant
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amounts of weaponry from Russia, including systems that will
potentially enhance its nuclear force structure. These sales should not
be viewed, however, as a strengthening of the Russia-India strategic
partnership but, instead, as a commercial venture on the part of
the Russians. For the Indians, similarly, the purchase of weaponry
from Russia comes as much from the inability to conclude domestic
weapons programs successfully, as the willingness of Russia to
once again throw open its arms cupboard and provide India with
weapons systems that it could neither afford or get the permission
to purchase from western suppliers. At the same time India-Russia
trade relations no longer have the importance that they did during
the Cold War. Indian exports to Russia are less than 2 percent of the
country’s total exports, while its imports from Russia are less than 1
percent of total imports. Optimistic assessments of India-Russia trade
suggest that the two countries may reach $5 billion in bilateral trade
by 2005, almost half of what is projected for India-China trade.
But perhaps the most difﬁcult part of creating a Russia-India
strategic partnership is how little Russia can now offer politically or
economically to India. Politically, Russia is no longer the force the
former Soviet Union was and consequently cannot serve as a counter
to either China or the United States. Economically, Indian businesses
remain pessimistic about the prospects in the Russian market.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov complained in an interview
that India had yet to recognize that Russia was a market economy,
and that Indian banks and other ﬁnancial structures needed to accept
the guarantees of private Russian banks.22
The decline of Russia’s fortunes have led the Indian political
leadership to recognize the limits of this old relationship, and,
while Russia continues to serve as India principal armorer, it is
not a relationship that can be used politically to enhance India’s
ascension to a great power status. Thus while being uncomfortable
with America’s unipolar status, India will have to rely on the United
States to achieve its own great power aspirations.
The third contradictory factor is that India continues to seek a
South Asia that is free from the inﬂuences of external powers and
where it is the paramount country in the region. Such a goal may
remain at odds with those of the United States, which views a
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relationship with Pakistan as a key part of the War on Terror. India
views with concern the perceived American attempt to equate the
two countries (particularly in their nuclear policies) and believes
that the United States has not put enough pressure on Pakistan to
halt its support to jihadi groups operating in Indian Kashmir.
From an Indian perspective, the other important aspect of U.S.
foreign policy that has implications for India is that only two longterm strategic partnerships with the United States actually exist―
one with Israel and the other with the United Kingdom. With these
countries, the United States is the closest when it comes to consulting
on operations, commitments of defense, the sharing of technology,
and the willingness to apply pressure on other states to facilitate
these countries’ diplomatic strategies and to enhance their national
security.
It would be difﬁcult for India to create a similar strategic
relationship with the United States because it neither has the historical
and cultural ties that have forged these strategic relationships, nor
does it want, as a reformist state, to pursue the types of policies that
would cement such a relationship. India would be unwilling to be
the type of military partner that the United Kingdom has been in
U.S. global military efforts. The Indian unwillingness to commit to
the ﬁrst and second Gulf War coalitions is a case in point. Further,
India does not have the type of historical and cultural-emotional
ties that have forged a strong U.S.-Israel relationship. While IndianAmericans have played a role in cementing these ties,23 it would be
an exaggeration to suggest that they have the type of political and
economic inﬂuence that the American Jewish community does.
Lastly, for a congruence of American and Indian worldviews, there
has to be recognition of India’s quest to become a global power. Yet
current American policies, both intentionally and unintentionally,
serve to restrict such progress. The ﬁrst major constraint is the
U.S. lack of recognition of India’s nuclear status. Despite the 1998
tests and the subsequent lengthy meetings between then Deputy
Secretary of State Strobe Talbott and then Foreign Minister Jaswant
Singh, ofﬁcial U.S. policy remains one of not recognizing India as a
nuclear weapons state. Instead, the ofﬁcial policy is to get India to
become a signatory to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)
and to terminate its nuclear weapons program. As U.S. Assistant
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Secretary for Nonproliferation John Wolf stated at the Third Session
of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the
Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York,
May 4, 2004):
Turning to South Asia, our focus there is not on compliance, as neither
India nor Pakistan is a party to the NPT. While we remain committed to
universal NPT adherence, our focus in South Asia has been, and remains,
on preventing actions that would undermine the global nonproliferation
regime and regional stability―be it through nuclear testing, deployment,
nuclear use, or proliferation to other countries. The United States has an
active dialogue with both countries on these issues.
We have taken steps recently with both countries to strengthen relations
in order to advance our regional goals, enhance the ﬁght against terrorism,
and to secure cooperation from both countries on export controls. These
steps should not, however, be taken to suggest that we have “accepted” the
status of either country as a nuclear weapon state under the NPT. We have
not. Moreover, we will not reward either country for their decisions to acquire
nuclear weapons or for the 1998 tests that made the world and the region a more
dangerous place (emphasis added).
We have steadfastly avoided taking any actions that would be contrary to our
long-established nuclear export control policy. India and Pakistan remain
ineligible under U.S. law and policy for any signiﬁcant assistance to their
nuclear programs. We continue to call on India and Pakistan not to conduct
nuclear tests, to end the production of ﬁssile material for nuclear weapons, to
take steps to reduce regional tensions and to prevent the use of nuclear weapons
(emphasis added).24

Such recognition is crucial, however, because it would lead to a
change in the policies of all the de jure nuclear powers that continue
to deny India its rightful nuclear status. Further, the lack of a legal
nuclear status prevents the transfer of vital technologies that India
requires for its own modernization and economic development.
India would like to get a range of dual use and space technologies
from the United States since these are crucial to the country’s
future economic and technological growth. For several reasons,
the United States has been reluctant to transfer such technologies.25
Nonproliferation concerns drive such reservations since American
ofﬁcials are worried about the transfer of sensitive technologies to
third parties. While the United States has agreed to ease some of the
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restrictions on the sale of dual-use, space, and nuclear technologies
to India,26 the U.S. Department of Commerce has made it clear that
such transfers will be for civilian purposes and take place within the
limits set by multilateral nonproliferation regimes.27 This has led to
suggestions that the recent reported progress in the National Security
Studies Program (NSSP) is cosmetic at best.28 U.S. ofﬁcials, however,
contend that signiﬁcant changes have taken place, removing the need
for 25 percent of all license applications for U.S. exports to India.29
At some stage, however, technology transfers in the military ﬁeld
also will have to be considered. And as long as such multilateral
limits exist, it could mean the imposition of sanctions when India
takes measures in the military ﬁeld that are inimical to broader U.S.
interests.
Coupled with the problems associated with technology transfers
are the divergent views on the Indian nuclear program. Despite 14
meetings between Talbott and Singh (after the India’s 1998 nuclear
tests), the United States remains committed in the long term to
having India rollback its nuclear program and sign the NPT. Until
this ofﬁcial position is reversed, India will neither achieve its status
as a legitimate major power nor can Washington expect New Delhi
to be a willing and cooperative partner in matters of international
security. This lack of international recognition for its nuclear
ambitions has placed India in the position of not being able to utilize
its nuclear capability to enhance its security and its international
status. Resolving the nuclear issue is vitally important to India, given
that it has the status of a third tier nuclear state.
India: Third Tier Nuclear State?
In fact, since 1998, India has been a third-tier nuclear state. First
tier nuclear states (the United States and Russia) have far greater
numbers of nuclear weapons than their nearest rivals. They also
have global reach with their nuclear weapons and can deter nuclear
retaliation by other states, particularly those at lower tiers in the
nuclear hierarchy.30
Second tier nuclear states have smaller nuclear forces with
less advanced technological capabilities than ﬁrst tier states and
an extraregional, but not global, reach. While they have a ﬁrst use
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capability against more powerful states, they do not have a ﬁrst
strike capability. Nor do they have a credible deterrent capability
against ﬁrst tier states.
Third tier nuclear states (which currently include India,
Israel, Pakistan, and possibly North Korea) have forces that are
numerically small, not technologically advanced, limited in range to
their regions, and do not have a deterrent capability against ﬁrst or
second tier nuclear states.31 The management of nuclear crises at the
third tier level also has required the intervention of external parties.
Additionally, no third tier nuclear state has been involved in the
decisionmaking processes that framed the legal and institutional basis
of the international nuclear order. Instead, these states have been the
targets of the international regimes created to check proliferation.
Indian analyst Sisir Gupta explained the limitations of the third
tier state when he wrote that becoming a nuclear state would be
insufﬁcient for enhancing the country’s security or its international
status. Instead, India would become just one of several countries to
have a nuclear capability. Gupta argued that if India had to be more
than just another nuclear state (the n plus 20 dilemma), it would have
to use its nuclear status to reshape the international system.32
Gupta’s analysis is still relevant in the present-day international
context. India’s current nuclear capability and its glacial progress
towards developing a stronger nuclear capability condemn it to the
status of a third tier nuclear state. For India to be viewed as more
than a regional nuclear power that is obsessed with Pakistan, it has
to develop a nuclear deterrent that is taken seriously by China as
well as the other ﬁrst and second tier nuclear states.
In the case of China, India, at present, lacks the ability to target its
eastern seaboard and, therefore, lacks a credible deterrent against that
country. The Indian government has, in fact, repeatedly postponed
the testing of the Agni III missile that would give India such a
capability. India’s reticence to do so may result from technical delays
or the desire to not strain a Sino-Indian relationship that is beginning
to thaw and move forward along positive lines. Yet without such
a capability, India will not be taken seriously in China’s strategic
calculations.
A credible deterrent also would require the acquisition of
a nuclear submarine ﬂeet that would provide a second strike
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capability against both China and Pakistan. Indian Navy Chief
Admiral Arun Prakash has asked for such a capability, but the
indigenous Advanced Technology Vehicle Project is making slow
progress, and India, ofﬁcially at least, has not penned a deal with
Russia to acquire the nuclear-powered Akula submarines.33
The United States is not keen to see the development of an Indian
nuclear capability. As Ashley Tellis has argued, the United States
would like India to have a nuclear force that has no intercontinental
ballistic missiles (ICBMs), where the growth of the nuclear force is
slow, and the number of weapons built is low.34 The no ICBM, slow
and low approach satisﬁes Washington because it does not give India
a military capability to threaten the continental United States. At the
same time, the slow and low approach would ensure that the South
Asian arms race did not escalate rapidly or that the rapid growth of
a nuclear force presented the problems of ensuring the security of
nuclear weapons.
For the United States, the central concerns are that India and
Pakistan not enter into a shooting war that escalates rapidly to a
potential nuclear showdown. Such a conﬂict would jeopardize U.S.
counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and drag
Washington into a South Asian nuclear conﬂict. The other concern
is that both Indian and Pakistani nuclear forces remain secure and
do not fall into the wrong hands. Here, too, there is a real problem
created by India’s de facto, as opposed to de jure, nuclear status.
Lacking legal recognition, neither India, or for that matter Pakistan,
can receive technologies like permissive action links (PALs)―
electromechanical locking mechanisms that safeguard nuclear
weapons from unauthorized use―to make their weapons safer.
The American logic is that, apart from being a violation of existing
nonproliferation laws,35 transferring such technologies would make
it easier to deploy such weapons and increase the likelihood of their
usage.
The three American concerns of no ICBMs, slow growth, and
low numbers condemn India to a third tier nuclear status that not
only makes it difﬁcult for the country to achieve a credible nuclear
capability, but also to be a nuclear state that will not be taken
seriously when it comes to engaging in discussions about the future
of the international nuclear order. No ICBMs and the lack of a
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submarine-launched force essentially would take away the Indian
ability to deter China (with Pakistan being a different case).36 The
present nuclear force provides a second use capability against China
and that, too, is only against mid-level towns in the southwestern
regions of China and not China’s industrial heartland.37 A second
use capability provides an ability to hurt China, but it is difﬁcult to
say whether an attack on a second level town that is not in China’s
political heartland would deter military action by Beijing.
A second problem with the possession of a third tier nuclear
force is that it does little to enhance the country’s prestige or its
ability to translate its military capability into political leverage. As
Bharat Wariawalla has argued, if nuclear weapons are the currency
of international power, then a country has to be able to display that
currency.38 An India that is reduced by international constraints to
possessing a third tier nuclear force with limited range and limited
capabilities would never be invited by the major powers to participate
in global disarmament negotiations since the currency it displays
would be a weak one.
Third, if India is to play the role of stabilizer in Asia, it
requires fewer restrictions placed on its nuclear and conventional
capabilities. This not only requires giving India a freer hand with
its nuclear force structure but also providing the technologies to
enhance its conventional capabilities. At the conventional level,
one such restriction is the denial of missile defense technology to
India. If India is to successfully operationalize its no-ﬁrst use nuclear
doctrine, it has to build in a capability to deal with an accidental or
unauthorized launch of nuclear weapons by an enemy state. To do
so, a national missile defense capability is essential since it could
help protect against such an attack and maintain a high nuclear
threshold. A national missile defense capability would also reiterate
India’s intention to be a defensive, as opposed to an offensive, nuclear
power. On the other hand, some would argue that providing India
with a nuclear missile defense (NMD) capability would enhance its
ability to wage war against Pakistan and thus destabilize the South
Asian region. For this reason, sections of the U.S. Government have
opposed the sale of the Israeli Arrow anti-ballistic missile to India.
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Domestic Political Opposition.
There is also continued opposition among some Indian domestic
political groups about forging a closer relationship with the United
States. The main party in the ruling United Progressive Alliance, the
Indian National Congress, would like to continue India’s traditional
policy of nonalignment even though it has limited utility in the
present-day international system. While in the opposition, current
Indian foreign minister Natwar Singh argued that nonalignment
had effectively served the country’s interests. As he put it, “The
broad foreign policy framework left behind by Nehru has stood us in
good stead. There is no other foreign policy India can follow without
becoming a satellite. The people of India will not allow this country
to be a camp follower of any country, howsoever powerful.”39
Reﬂecting the continued wariness about unipolarity, the Indian
parliament, in fact, unanimously condemned the U.S. attack on
Iraq even as the two countries were headed towards joint military
exercises. More recently, the various Indian political parties strongly
criticized the government when it said it would closely consider a
U.S. proposal for sending Indian troops to Iraq. The Communist
Party of India (Marxist) said in a statement that the foreign minister’s
ambiguous remarks in Washington (about taking a close look at the
idea of sending troops) had to be clariﬁed and that, “The government
must make it clear that there is no question of sending troops to Iraq
to bolster the American occupation.” The statement continued that
there had been no change in the situation in Iraq whatsoever and,
“Iraq has been under American occupation for the last 14 months.
There is a popular uprising against the brutal occupation.”40
On the other hand, the death of the Cold War presented a series
of opportunities to India as the constraints of bipolarity no longer
shaped the conduct of Indian foreign policy. No longer constrained
by Cold War politics that had seen a growing dependence on the
Soviet Union and an attempted relationship with the Arab countries,
India was to move in the 1990s to forge a closer relationship with the
United States. From a military-strategic perspective, it recognized
Israel in 1992, and, a decade later, Israel had emerged as the second
largest seller of weaponry to India. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)
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viewed a strong relationship with the United States as essential to its
plans for developing India and securing it from external threats. As
part of the move towards the United States, India also redeﬁned its
policy towards Israel.
In the period of nonalignment, India supported the Arab nations
and never gave full diplomatic recognition to Israel. This changed
in the early 1990s when the Narasimha Rao government recognized
Israel, and an exchange of ambassadors took place. Under the BJP
government, the relationship rapidly improved primarily in the area
of security cooperation. Israel became the second largest supplier of
arms to India. It proved its worth as a reliable supplier by dipping
into its war reserves and providing India with the much need
artillery shells and mortars to ﬁght the 1999 Kargil limited war with
Pakistan.
Since then, a burgeoning military relationship has emerged
between the two countries, and Israel is providing the critical
subsystems to upgrade India’s Russian arsenal. Israel has also
sold the Green Pine early warning radar to India and would like to
complement it with the Arrow 2 anti-ballistic missile. The sale of the
Phalcon airborne early warning system has also been ﬁnalized.41
Israeli analysts and some proponents of the relationship in India
view this as a U.S.-Israel-India coalition against terrorism. While
this posture has deﬁnite advantages, particularly the fact that three
democratic nations are cooperating, it has also led to the danger
of being branded as a Hindu-Zionist-Christian alliance against the
Islamic world.
The Israel-India relationship is unlikely to breakdown since
the two countries have complementary interests, and the Indian
government is careful to maintain a continued and strong relationship
with the Arab nations and Iran. Indian ﬁrms have found natural
gas in Yemen, Oman is considering investments in Indian industry,
and India working with Iran to create a Mumbai-Chah Bahar-St.
Petersburg corridor that will cut down the time taken to transport
goods, but also work to open economic possibilities along the
length of the proposed corridor. India has signed an agreement to
purchase natural gas from Iran, and there has been some discussion
about extending the proposed Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan
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pipeline to India. These foreign policy moves brought India into
greater consonance with U.S. global strategy.
The tension between such constraints and opportunities is
shaping Indian policy towards the United States. India is moving
towards a closer relationship with the United States while still
maintaining reservations about how strongly to develop these ties. As
a consequence, the U.S.-India security relationship is growing along
two lines: on the one hand, there is increasing military and other
security related cooperation between the two countries, as witnessed
by 10 joint military exercises in the past 2 years; on the other, there is
a feeling of disquiet in New Delhi that the United States is unable to
get Pakistan to halt cross-border terrorism completely. Given these
tensions between constraints and opportunities, it is necessary to
look at the supposed bases of the current relationship to see which
of these can actually help the development of stronger bilateral ties.
Basis of the Relationship.
Analysts argue that the recent upswing in India-U.S. relations
has been driven by three factors: the existence of an Indian diaspora
in the United States; the tactical need to coordinate strategies with
India following the demands of the War on Terror; and the Bush
administration’s belief that India could play a role in the long run as
a strategic partner of the United States.
The long-term effectiveness of all three factors in cementing the
relationship has to be qualiﬁed. First, the role and inﬂuence of the
Indian diaspora has been overhyped, and its ability to bring the
relationship forward has to be tempered. One of the mistaken beliefs
about the Indian diaspora is that it can do for India what the American
Jewish community has been able to do for Israel. As the Government
of India’s High Level Committee on the Indian Diaspora put it:
A section of ﬁnancially powerful and politically well-connected IndoAmericans has emerged during the last decade. They have effectively
mobilized on issues ranging from the nuclear tests in 1998 to Kargil, played
a crucial role in generating a favorable climate of opinion in Congress and
defeating anti-India legislation there, and lobbied effectively on other
issues of concern to the Indian community. They have also demonstrated
willingness to contribute ﬁnancially to Indian causes, such as relief for the
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Orissa cyclone and the Latur and Gujarat earthquakes, higher technical
education and innumerable charitable causes.
For the ﬁrst time, India has a constituency in the U.S. with real inﬂuence
and status. The Indian community in the United States constitutes an
invaluable asset in strengthening India’s relationship with the world’s
only superpower.42

For a number of reasons, however, the Indian-American
community is not similar to the American Jewish community and,
therefore, it cannot be used as a role model for inﬂuencing policy
decisions. The Indian American community is relatively small,
approximately 1.7 million people, according to the 2000 census,
and even if it were to double in the next decade, as it conceivably
will, it will only be about 1 percent of the American population of
approximately 300 million. Second, the community does not have
the spatial concentration that the Jewish community does in New
York or the Cuban-American community has in Miami. Its ability to
inﬂuence elections in key constituencies or states is limited. Third,
the Indian-American community gave about $7 million in election
contributions for the 2000 campaign. This is a miniscule amount
when compared to the billions of dollars that were raised in campaign
contributions. Fourth, the Indian community, for the most part,
is a new community, with its most successful members only now
reaching that age group, between 50-65, that contributes generously
to political campaigns. When compared with the century-long Jewish
community’s political contributions and public philanthropy―the
creation, for example, of ﬁrst rate hospitals―the Indian community’s
inﬂuence is far more modest.43
In some areas, notably on the India-Pakistan issue, the Indian
diaspora has played a useful role, but it should be recognized that
policy measures taken in this area have been in consonance with
American foreign policy objectives and not sharply against them.
After 9/11, it was only a matter of time before the United States
rescinded the economic sanctions it had imposed on India. Finally,
some evidence suggests that the support the Indian diaspora provides
India on the India-Pakistan issue may not survive a generational
change. The generation of Indians who ﬁrst migrated to this country
are the ones most concerned with the issue. The generation born in
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America is less concerned about it and, in fact, some have taken to
identifying themselves as South Asian-Americans much in the same
way as Latinos or African-Americans. Others, however, have taken
the path of calling themselves Hindu-Americans.44 The ability of the
diaspora to signiﬁcantly shape India-U.S. relations, therefore, must
be placed at a more modest level than what some analysts, including
members of the Indian government, have been arguing.
The War on Terror.
The second rationale for security cooperation and stronger
ties comes from the mutual challenges that India and the United
States face in the War on Terror effort. This has seen the growth of
cooperation in the areas of law enforcement, intelligence sharing,
and, more recently, discussions on technology controls. While these
are important steps, they have the tendency of becoming one-sided
and may cause legal problems within the country. The United States,
as in the case of Pakistan, may ask for an access to Indian airports to
conduct biometric scans of outgoing passengers. Such scans can be
considered intrusive and may violate the rights of Indian citizens.
Further, there is no guarantee that India will get reciprocal rights to
identify, track, and extradite people implicated in terrorist activities
against it. These, however, are technical issues that can be resolved
through bureaucratic negotiations. More problematic are the
contradictory views of the United States and India on what exactly
constitutes a War on Terror.
In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, the Indian government
offered its wholehearted support to the United States because
it viewed the U.S. newly declared War on Terror as one that was
aimed at comprehensively dismantling radical groups in South Asia.
It also erroneously believed that the United States would view the
problem of terror as emanating from both Afghanistan and Pakistan
and work militarily and politically to isolate both countries.
Instead, the United States took a position that did not satisfy
Indian security interests. It agreed to put diplomatic pressure on
General Musharraf to halt cross-border terrorism but was unable to
bring about a complete halt of terrorist activity. As C. Raja Mohan
explains:
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In India, there is rising disenchantment at the American unwillingness or
inability to deliver Pakistan on cross-border terrorism. This is compounded
by renewed calls from Washington for a dialogue with Pakistan. New
Delhi says it stood down in the military confrontation with Islamabad
last summer following assurances from the highest level in Washington
that the Pakistan President, Pervez Musharraf, had promised to put an
end to inﬁltration of terrorists on a permanent basis. Having failed to get
Gen. Musharraf to keep his promise, the Government argues, the U.S.
has no business to push India into an engagement with Pakistan.45

Despite ongoing negotiations between India and Pakistan,
disappointment continues in New Delhi about the efforts to get the
United States to create an anti-terrorism policy that is in consonance
with Indian objectives. This led the Indian prime minister, in
September 2004, to express his frustration before the UN:
We speak about cooperation [against terrorism] but seem hesitant to
commit ourselves to a global offensive to root out terrorism, with the
pooling of resources, exchange of information, sharing of intelligence, and
the unambiguous unity of purpose required. This must change. We do
have a global coalition against terrorism. We must give it substance and
credibility, avoiding selective approaches and political expediency.46

Indian analysts also point out that India’s dependence on the
United States, and its deference to Washington’s goals in the region,
cost the country its military credibility vis-à-vis Pakistan. While,
in the aftermath of the military standoff of May-June 2002, Indian
policymakers congratulated themselves on the ability to use coercive
diplomacy against Pakistan, the statements emerging from Islamabad
suggested that General Musharraf thought otherwise. Instead, the
Pakistani government congratulated itself on calling the Indian
bluff through a mixture of conventional and nuclear deterrence.
Thus Islamabad, much like New Delhi, may have learned the wrong
lessons from the 2002 crisis.
Strategic Partnership?
The Constraints of a Hyphenated Relationship.
The third potential basis for the relationship is the idea of a
strategic partnership, but any such partnership would depend on
removing the hyphen in U.S.-India relations―by making it separate
26

from the relationship with Pakistan. On September 9, 2002, Indian
foreign minister Yashwant Sinha declared in a speech at the
Brookings Institution that the India-U.S. relationship would no
longer be a hyphenated one that included Pakistan. Instead, it would
be a bilateral relationship where the problems caused by the U.S. link
with Islamabad would be downplayed. In fact, India continues to
link the Pakistan issue in its dealings with the United States. Before
discussing the broader U.S.-India relationship, it is necessary to
discuss the misperceptions that complicate Pakistan-India relations
and the U.S.-India-Pakistan hyphenated relationship.
India-Pakistan Relations.
The Indian and Pakistani views of each other are based on
unrealistic appraisals. Sections of India’s leadership view Pakistanis
as long-lost prodigal brothers who will one day see the light and
move towards a more constructive relationship with people who
are culturally and ethnically similar to them. This view was echoed
by India former deputy prime minister L. K. Advani who said, “If
East and West Germany could unite despite acrimonious political
relations, why not India and Pakistan? There may be difﬁculties,
but it is not impossible. A day will come when the people of both
countries will realize that partition has done no good to them.”47
The opposite is true. For Pakistan, a closer relationship with India
essentially would mean undoing partition and would place severe
challenges on the Pakistani national identity. It would also be the
ﬁrst step in wiping out the political and cultural distinctiveness of
Pakistan. Such a distinctiveness could be retained if Pakistan’s identity
as a nation-state was secure, but two sets of constraints―economic
and political―make it difﬁcult to have a concrete Pakistani identity.
Economically, the War on Terror has beneﬁted Pakistan by obtaining
U.S. assistance in securing International Monetary Fund (IMF)
loans and in stabilizing the economy, and the country has witnessed
creditable economic growth. But the larger structural constraints
that drive the economy have yet to be removed successfully, most
notably a halting drive towards market reforms and the ability of
the Pakistani government to raise revenues. Coupled with this is the
problem of alleviating poverty in Pakistan. The last available ﬁgures
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on poverty levels in the country show an increase in the population
share of people living below the ofﬁcial poverty line from 26 percent
in 1990-91 to 32 percent 2000-01.48
Politically, Pakistan remains a society where ethnic identities
supercede national loyalties. Thus both the North West Frontier and
Baluchistan remain feudal holdouts as witnessed by the delicate
balancing that President Pervez Musharraf has had to undertake to
carry out operations against al-Qaeda in these areas. There has also
been talk of rising secessionist feelings in Baluchistan. The rise of
the fundamentalists in Pakistan, while not threatening the territorial
integrity of the state or for that matter the control of the Pakistani
military, also suggests that the potential for greater domestic
instability exists in that country.
Pakistan’s perceptions of India are similarly ﬂawed and come, by
and large, from two historical frames of reference―the partition of
1947 and the creation of Bangladesh in 1971. Thus ofﬁcial Pakistani
statements, as well as those of analysts and scholars, continue to
harp on the two-nation theory, even though it was discredited with
Bangladesh’s creation. Within this framework falls the Kashmir issue,
which Pakistani analysts argue is a core part of Pakistan’s national
identity.
President Musharraf has stated that the only way for Pakistan to
have a peace with honor is for a settlement to the Kashmir dispute.49
This denies a fundamental problem in India-Pakistan relations: that
Kashmir is a symptom and not the cause of hostile relations between
India and Pakistan. The real threat for Pakistan remains India’s
size (which does matter) and the fact that it remains a multiethnic,
multireligious state. Aslam Siddiqi, a Pakistani scholar writing in
1948, argued that when a small nation bordered a larger nation, the
larger nation was likely to dominate it. Geo-political considerations
therefore, made it necessary for the smaller country to resist such
domination.50 For Pakistan, this geo-political constraint continues to
exist, and it grows with the strengthening of the Indian economy and
the country’s conventional military capability. The other problem
comes from the fact that a secular and democratic India makes the
need for a Pakistan irrelevant.
Given these facts, resolving Kashmir may not be in the long-term
interests of the Pakistani elite. A satisfactory solution for Pakistan,
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one that fulﬁlls its national identity, requires a transfer of all, or
at least a signiﬁcant portion, of Indian Kashmir to Pakistan. Yet
this is likely to create more problems for Pakistan that it resolves.
It would still leave India a large country of a billion people with
a rabidily nationalist government armed with nuclear weapons.
This would exacerbate Pakistan’s security dilemma. On the other
hand, continuing a Kashmir dispute, with casualty levels that are
acceptable to India, works to further Pakistan’s military interests. A
low level insurgency keeps signiﬁcant numbers of Indian troops tied
down in Kashmir, thus preventing them from being used against
Pakistan. The domestic consequences of such a resolution would be
equally problematic. Once Kashmir is resolved, the rationale for high
defense expenditure in Pakistan would be removed, thus threatening
the power and prestige of the Pakistani military.
From the perspective of U.S.-India relations, the Pakistani link
will continue until India attempts to develop a new bilateral means
to deal with Pakistan. This includes the ability to communicate with
Pakistan in a crisis and, most importantly, to be able to make a range
of credible threats to Pakistan to ensure that Islamabad is deterred
from carrying out actions seen as inimical to Indian interests. In
the existing situation, however, the credibility of India to achieve
compellance is limited. Its 2002 mobilization along the India-Pakistan
border was claimed as a victory for coercive diplomacy by the Indian
government. Yet Pakistani ofﬁcials issued statements arguing that
they were coerced by the Indian threat. Instead, President Pervez
Musharraf argued that what prevented India from initiating a war was
his threat, conveyed through world leaders, to use unconventional
measures to halt an Indian conventional attack.51
Coupled with the perceived inability to use nuclear weapons
as tools of compellance lies the problem that India and Pakistan
are now starting to put mechanisms in place that permit direct
communications in a crisis. While a “hotline” exists between the
military commanders in the ﬁeld, it did little to provide any sense of
security or information to Pakistan about what Indian motives were
in a possible conﬂict in 2002. In fact, during the May-June 2002 crisis,
Ambassador Lodhi claimed that the hotline had not been working
“for some days now.”52 Thus Pakistan’s leadership had to prepare
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for the worst and issue threats for the possible ﬁrst use of nuclear
weapons.
In the past few months, both countries have recognized the need
for more effective communications so as to prevent the escalation
of tensions and to further conﬁdence-building. In June 2004, the
two countries agreed to establish a hotline between their Foreign
Secretaries and Directors General of Military Operations “to
prevent misunderstandings and reduce risks relevant to nuclear
issues.”53 While establishing direct lines of communications (LOC)
is important, the real problem lies in getting both sides to trust the
messages they send each other in a crisis. Removing the hyphen thus
may seem rhetorically easy, but it cannot happen unless the Indian
government is able to negotiate on substantive issues with Pakistan.
The problem, however, remains one of how to enter into negotiations
without dealing with the Kashmir issue.
A more plausible basis for the relationship comes from the idea
that both the United States and India are democracies that share
the values of freedom and secularism. Like the United States, India
views with concern the breakdown of democracy in the surrounding
regions and is also worried by the rise of radical Islamic groups in
Central, South, and Southwest Asia. Like the United States, it also
would like to see stability in the Indian Ocean littoral and prevent the
growth of piracy and maritime terrorism―the 1993 Mumbai bomb
blasts were done by a group that smuggled eight and a half tons of
cyclotrimethylene trinitramine (RDX) explosives into the country by
sea. If these mutually shared values and complementary interests are
taken into account, then there is a potential for cooperation between
the two states on a range of issues.
Cooperation and Its Limits.
In the past few years, India-U.S. relations have focused on military
cooperation, the possibility of technology transfers, and discussions
about India’s potential as an emerging market. Military cooperation
has been the most highly visible aspect of the changed relations
between the two countries. The two militaries have conducted
10 joint exercises, and Indian naval vessels have been escorting
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American naval assets from the Straits of Malacca to the Arabian
Sea, thus freeing up American ships for other operations.
Military cooperation can be carried out in joint operations
or in India providing forces for peacekeeping operations. Both
technological limitations and political attitudes make joint operations
difﬁcult in the near future. At the technological level, Indian military
equipment and communications infrastructure is a generation
to a generation-and-a-half behind that of the United States. This
makes it difﬁcult to launch operations or share information in real
time. Unless the United States is willing to transfer the requisite
technologies, such cooperation would not be possible. For India to
acquire this technology, a qualitatively different relationship would
have to emerge where the United States trusted India’s ability to keep
transferred technology secure from theft or illegal transfers. It would
also require the type of close political and military cooperation that
the United States has with its NATO allies.
Technology Transfers: The Development
of India’s Space Program.
The NSSP undertakes to move India gradually from a country
that was on various U.S. export control lists to one that can avail
itself of civilian nuclear, civilian space, dual-use, and eventually
ballistic missile defense (BMD) technology―what has been dubbed
the glide path. Of these, BMD technology transfers will only happen
in the long run because, given India’s creeping weaponization, it
will take New Delhi considerable time to ﬁgure out what its BMD
and theater missile defense (TMD) requirements are. In the short
run, the transfer of civilian space technology may work to further
the relationship, but here, too, there is a divergence of views on the
utility of the NSSP. On the American side, Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Export Administration Matthew S. Borman has pointed out that
the signiﬁcance of the NSSP lies in the fact that both the United
States and India share common interests of nonproliferation and
facilitating high-technology trade. Consequently, they have taken a
set of reciprocal steps that are consistent with each others’ laws. The
United States has removed the Indian Space Research Organization’s
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(ISRO) headquarters from the Commerce Department’s entity list. It
has also applied a presumption of approval for all dual-use items
(although this does not cover the troubled Indian nuclear reactors
at Tarapur that come under restrictions placed by the Nuclear
Suppliers Group). The United States has also agreed to eliminate the
need for export licenses for 25 percent of U.S. items that India seeks
to import.54
On the Indian side, doubts remain about the reliability of the
United States as a supplier and the extent to which restrictions, in
fact, have been removed. It has been argued that because the United
States will adhere to its international commitments and to its domestic
laws, India will acquire few substantive items for its space program.
Further, the fact that ISRO’s subsidiaries remain on the restricted list
means that the space organization will be able to import few of the
items it requires.55
Traditional Indian concerns about the challenges posed to Indian
sovereignty have also been raised. Indian commentators point out
that the sanctions on particular Indian scientists have not been raised,
that the Indian Ministry of External Affairs has not clariﬁed what
reassurances India had to give the United States, and that India had
to accept the appointment of a technology control attaché at the U.S.
embassy in New Delhi as examples of how the country’s sovereignty
was being restricted.56
If the NSSP is to work, therefore, it becomes imperative that a
satisfactory level of technology transfers takes place in this area,
satisfying supporters of the initiative in the Indian government as
well as silencing critics both within and outside it. The only way to
do this is to develop a credible record of technology transfers over
a period of time. At the same time, the Indian government would
need to prove that the technology transfers it receives continue to be
protected and are not leaked to third parties. If such a track record is
created by both countries, then a level of mutual trust would arise and
permit them to graduate to more signiﬁcant levels of cooperation.
Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement.
India has a long tradition of peacekeeping, and it could play
an important part in future nation-building efforts by the United
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States around the world. As General Arjan Ray has pointed out,
the Indian armed forces have experience, or trained for, diverse
military operations that include nuclear war, conventional war,
counterinsurgencies, and civilian relief efforts. The Indian armed
forces also have combat experience in high altitude warfare, as well
as desert and jungle warfare. The strong tradition of civil-military
relations in the country are also beneﬁcial to peacekeeping efforts
since it means the Indian military force is conducive to receiving
orders from civilian administrators and implementing them.
Additionally, the Indians have a rich experience in peacekeeping,
having participated in UN efforts since the Korean War. In Somalia,
for instance:
The Indian contingent dug a large number of wells, constructed schools
and mosques, and ran mobile dispensaries and relief camps, which
provided veterinary care, and medical and humanitarian relief to a large
number of Somalis and their livestock. It also organized and carried out
rehabilitation and resettlement of thousands of refugees and helped to
repatriate them to their homes. The Indian contingent played a vital role
in reviving the political process by organizing reconciliation meetings.57

Politically, peacekeeping missions run into Indian concerns
about American unilateralism and the differing worldviews on the
threats in the international system. India is unlikely to send troops
on peacekeeping or joint military operations unless it is legitimized
by a resolution from the UN or some other multilateral institution.
The decision to not send troops to Iraq was taken because such a
multilateral consensus was unavailable. Having said that, the Indian
government would be particularly interested in maintaining peace
in the Indian Ocean littoral and in the broader Asian region. It
would, therefore, seriously consider all requests for peacekeeping
forces. What would make India more proactive in this area would be
recognition of its regional role and a formal recognition of its global
role through UN Security Council membership. The other area where
India could facilitate America’s broader military-strategic interests is
helping to promote strategic stability in Asia.
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India in Asia: Implications for the United States.
India’s growing role in Asia and its perceived security challenges
mean that it shares complementary interests with the United States.
These interests can be summed up in three words: terrorism, energy,
and China. From 1962, when India lost its border war with China,
until the mid-1980s, when India was to engage in a military show of
strength along the Sino-Indian border, New Delhi had maintained a
policy on non-antagonism vis-à-vis Beijing. This did not mean that
the Indian government did not see China as a threat or that New
Delhi had given up its claim to the territories that China had seized
in 1962. Instead, there was a recognition that little could be done to
get China to withdraw from its aggression. At the same time, India
also tolerated Chinese assistance to the Pakistani nuclear program.
After the 1998 nuclear tests, however, India started to show a new
conﬁdence in its dealings with China, and the country’s strategic
analysts began to discuss possible ways to contain China. India’s
shift in thinking came from a growing conﬁdence in the country’s
military capabilities, as well as an increasing irritation with China
for having provided Pakistan with a missile capability that gave it a
credible nuclear delivery system against India.
Since then, India has followed a dual path in its relations with
China. On the one hand, it has sought to normalize relations and, in
2003, the visit of Prime Minister Vajpayee brought about signiﬁcant
progress in this area. The two countries agreed to appoint special
representatives to resolve the border dispute. More crucially, India
stated that Tibet was a part of China, thus removing a long-standing
irritant in the relationship. China reciprocated by tacitly accepting
that the state of Sikkim was part of India.58 Second, trade between the
two countries has ﬂourished as China has replaced Japan as India’s
largest trading partner in Asia. The two countries expect bilateral
trade to cross $10 billion by the end of 2004.59
The burgeoning economic ties also have important consequences
for the development of their respective domestic economies. For
China, the economic development of its western regions lies in
moving south through India and Burma. Lhasa to Kolkota was, until
the Chinese takeover of Tibet, a long-standing trade route. For India,
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its eastern and northeastern regions would beneﬁt similarly from
the opening of trade with China.60 The Northeast remains relatively
underdeveloped, and Indian observers believe that greater trade
with China would not only lead to greater prosperity, but also serve
to lessen the support to existing insurgencies in the region.
On the other hand, Indian military capabilities that have been
growing incrementally provide India with the ability to contain
Chinese expansion in Asia. Indian military doctrine has also started
to shift from a South Asian focus to one that recognizes the need for
a greater role in Asia. Indian Naval doctrine, for example, has been
rewritten to give the Navy a blue water role and an operational sphere
that stretches from the Straits of Hormuz to the Straits of Malacca.61
With this in mind, the Indian naval chief has publicly asked for the
acquisition of two nuclear submarines so that the Navy can be part,
ostensibly, of the country’s Minimum Nuclear Deterrent, and India
is reportedly in the last stages of negotiating the acquisitions of two
Akula class nuclear submarines.62
The Indian Navy is concerned about the growing Chinese presence
in the Indian Ocean, particularly its using Myanmar as a location for
monitoring facilities. Further, Indian defense analysts point out that
the Chinese development of the Pakistani port of Gwadar helps the
Chinese Navy encircle India. In fact, the fear of encirclement by China,
coupled with the use of proxies like Pakistan, has driven India’s plans
to build up its long-range military capability. The Indian Air Force
is now planning to have its Su-30s visit the Andaman Islands (that
belong to India but are 1,200 miles from the Indian coastline) so as
to give the military a strike capability that can reach Southeast Asia.
The obvious mission would be to stop a hostile Chinese incursion
into the Indian Ocean. Indian nuclear submarines, armed with the
300 kilometer Klub missile or the BrahMos PJ-10 supersonic missile,
could give the Indian Navy a second use capability against China.63
At the same time, India has been cautious about provoking China
with its military buildup. It has repeatedly postponed the testing of the
Agni-III missile that would give it the capability to hit targets deeper
in China. It has committed itself to a reduction of forces along the
Sino-Indian border, and in 1993 and 1996 signed conﬁdence-building
measures with China―the Peace and Tranquility Agreements―that
reduced force levels and pulled backed forces along the border.
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Practical considerations also limit the extent to which the Indians
can project military capability against China. India’s new aircraft
carrier, the Admiral Gorshkov, will not enter service till the end of the
decade. Nuclear submarines, when procured, are likely to have a
similar time frame for induction.
The pace at which Indian nuclearization is being carried out also
indicates the Indian belief that, while China’s intentions may be
suspect, Beijing is unlikely to attempt to alter dramatically the status
quo in the near future. Ashley Tellis has described India’s nuclear
buildup as creeping weaponization.64 The slow speed at which
warheads and delivery systems are being put together would suggest
that Indian security perceptions do not require rapid development
of a warﬁghting force.
To sum up, the Indians are cautious about China’s future ambitions
but, at the same time, are beginning to recognize that India-China
relations are not necessarily a zero-sum game. India-China relations
could go in three possible directions―coexistence, cooperation, and
conﬂict. Coexistence would entail the following trends:
• A slow movement towards the resolution of the Sino-Indian
border dispute. While there might be rhetorical exchanges, a
backslide in the progress made in the resolution of the dispute
is unlikely.
• A growth in trade with slower movement on the Indian side
towards greater regional integration between the Chinese
west and the Indian eastern and northeastern states.
• A slow move to build up the conventional and nuclear
forces so that India would be in a position to deter China’s
extraregional power projection, should the political-military
situation change.
A cooperative relationship, on the other hand, would mean:
• Continuing progress that led to the relatively quick resolution
of the border dispute.
• A move towards force reductions, especially reducing Chinese
nuclear force levels.
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• A concerted move by both countries towards regional economic
integration, and attempts at joint research and development
of civilian and possibly defense related technologies.
• China’s recognition of India’s role as a major Asian power
and commensurate moves by Beijing to accommodate Indian
interests. These would include dampening the Chinese
relationship with Pakistan.
A conﬂictual relationship could arise because of:
• The irretrievable collapse of the border talks and hostile
Chinese movements in South East Asia. A signiﬁcant Chinese
boost to Pakistan’s nuclear and missile capabilities would also
provoke a hostile reaction from India.
• A rapid move by India to militarize and upgrade its long range
military capability. This would mean a move from creeping
nuclearization to rapid nuclearization.
• A growing Chinese military presence in the Indian Ocean,
particularly if one sees the entry of Chinese nuclear submarines
into the area.
In the two less optimistic scenarios, Indian military power will
continue to develop and serve to counterbalance Chinese military
growth. The optimistic scenario, on the other hand, can only happen
when there is a transformation of Chinese behavior that leads
to a more cooperative framework of relations with all the major
countries of Asia. If that happens, not only would the Chinese threat
be reduced, but also true strategic stability would be established in
Asia. Since the coexistence and conﬂict scenarios are more likely,
it remains in American interests (as well as in those of the smaller
Southeast Asian and East Asian nations) to see the emergence in
Asia of a counterbalance to China. This particularly would be the
case if China sought to use force to change the status quo vis-à-vis
Taiwan.
As an Asian power, India would be ideologically and militarily
different from China. Being a democracy that espouses social justice
and economic growth, India provides an alternative role model to the
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nations of Asia that have based their economic growth models on the
Chinese approach―one that places community rights over individual
liberty. In its external policies, India, as a democracy, believes both
in multilateralism and the rule of international law. While China
also ofﬁcially subscribes to both, its totalitarian structure and past
behavior make it suspect in the eyes of its neighbors. Economically,
India is a large market with a bourgeoning middle class and
technologically skilled labor force. This provides an alternative to
China, although substantial reforms will be required before India
becomes as attractive a market for foreign direct investments as
China is.
The other area where Indian military capability could be
harnessed to facilitate American interests is in Central Asia. Indian
interests there are driven by three factors: the need for energy
resources and the potential of the Central Asian market; the attempt
to counterbalance Chinese and Pakistani presence in the region; and
the concern about radical Islam spreading from the region into India
(especially Kashmir).65
India viewed with concern the rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan
and the subsequent destabilization of the region caused by that
fundamentalist regime. It provided support to the Northern Alliance
and, with the Taliban’s ouster, has sought to develop a presence in
Central Asia. India has increased its cooperation with the Central
Asian states, particularly Tajikistan, where it has reportedly
established an air base.66 Such a base would not only permit military
action against anti-government forces in Central Asia, but also serve
to counter Pakistan’s efforts to establish “defense in depth” in the
region. Like India, the Central Asian states are concerned about the
growth of radical Islam and the threat it poses to their regimes that,
because they are post-Soviet in orientation, tend to be secular.
It has also actively engaged the Karzai government and established
a major diplomatic presence in Afghan cities and has reached an
agreement to train the Afghan national army.67 Like most regional
countries, India would like to prevent the reemergence of radical
Islamic groups in Central Asia and therefore would be willing to
help build the indigenous security capabilities of these countries. For
a United States strapped for manpower, Indian security assistance
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especially would be welcome since it would further Washington’s
own goal of checking radical Islam in the region―thereby freeing
U.S. troops for action in other theaters in the war against terror.
In terms of energy and economics, India would like to play a
growing role in Central Asia both to check the role of China and
Pakistan but also to satisfy its own developmental needs. By 2010,
Indian demand for natural gas may be as high as 77 billion cubic
meters, and a steady supply of gas from the resource rich Central
Asian countries would satisfy this demand.68 India, with Russia
and Iran, is engaged, therefore, in the development of a NorthSouth corridor (one that passes from Mumbai to Tehran and from
there to St. Petersburg) that would, among other things, open the
Central Asian economies to the outside world.69 India’s stakes in
Central Asia are, therefore, expanding, and we are seeing a series of
complementary U.S. interests emerge. For both countries, checking
the rise of radical Islam in the region is important. The opening of
the Central Asian economies, in which India is participating, will
reduce these countries’ crippling dependence on the other former
Soviet states, particularly Russia. And if India is able to help bring
Iran back into the international community of nations, it will create a
safer energy corridor than the one currently proposed to run through
Afghanistan and Pakistan.
As mentioned earlier, a growth in security cooperation between
the United States and India would rest on the removal of constraints
on Indian military and technological development, as well as an
appreciation of India’s emerging power potential. This, however, is
likely to be a long-term process and one marked with several speed
bumps as the American war against terror and the global policies
of nonproliferation work to limit what can be achieved in IndoU.S. relations. Given these limitations, it is important that India, in
the short-to-medium term, look for other avenues for successfully
engaging the United States. Two such avenues are that both the
United States and India share democratic values, and the other is to
look at nonmilitary approaches to engagement. Both these avenues
intersect in the growth of India’s soft power.
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The Value of Indian Soft Power.
As one of the major democracies of the world, India also has a
degree of soft power. It is a secular democracy, with a good and
affordable education system as well as an independent media.
As a secular democracy, India would like to see its immediate
neighborhood and the larger Asian region comprise nations that
share its political and cultural values. The spread of these values
is important if a long-term solution to the radicalization of Asian
societies is to be effected. The War on Terror attempts to deal only
with the symptoms of the greater problems of social injustice and
economic underdevelopment that plague developing societies.
To bring about such changes, there is a pressing need to provide
such societies with better educational training―especially for the
young people who form the majority populations in some of these
countries.
The United States has attempted to do this in Pakistan by
providing money to improve that nation’s phantom educational
system. But this effort is localized to one country, and its effectiveness
has yet to be determined. For such measures to have a signiﬁcant
impact, however, there is the need to provide higher technological
and managerial education to a growing number of students in such
countries. And there the United States runs into to both security and
resource problems.
In the post 9/11 world, the United States has started to place
restrictions on the entry of Muslim students. Even when it has
allowed students in, the high educational costs in the United States
make it difﬁcult to educate more than a very small number of students
from these countries. India, with its large number of universities
and its ability to provide a cheap and good education, makes a very
attractive alternative. India has approximately 226 universities, 428
engineering colleges, and more than 100 medical colleges, but the
number of foreign students studying in India is small―in 2003, it
was only 8,145.70
What India needs to do, therefore, is propose that the United
States help in expanding the Indian educational sector to make
Indian universities a viable and cost-effective alternative for students
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from West, Southwest, and Central Asia. The Indian government
could ask American educational institutions to collaborate with it
to develop educational programs as well as provide fellowships to
students from these countries. From an Indian perspective, such an
inﬂux of foreign students would increase India’s soft power, provide
it with greater inﬂuence in neighboring countries since it had trained
their technocratic elite, and help create a new leadership in these
states. For the United States, a population with a modern technocratic
education would serve as the entry point for American corporations
into such countries.
The other way of spreading Indian soft power is to create a virtual
classroom that can be accessed across Asia. Some have discussed
making Indian Institute of Technology classes accessible virtually
across Asia, and this would be the ﬁrst step in bringing about a larger
educational system that is deliverable across the world wide web. It is
envisaged that, “A hybrid satellite-based network capable of digital
video broadcast over two or three channels, data broadcasting, to
use idle hours between video broadcasting and very small aperture
terminal (VSAT), all coexistent on the same transponder, will form
the backbone of the virtual institute.”71
Following the launch in September 2004 of the Geostationary
Satellite 3 (GSAT 3 or EDUSAT) by the Indian Space Resesarch
Organization (ISRO), the ability to cover other South Asian countries,
either partially or fully, already exists.72 With this comes the ability
to impart a quality education in the rural areas of South Asia, thus
helping alleviate the problem created by the phantom education
system that exists in these areas.
Making New Delhi a Partner.
While such possibilities for cooperation exist, the question
becomes, “What incentives must be provided to make New Delhi
a willing player in securing complementary security goals?” The
Indian government would like to secure three objectives in its foreign
relations―the legalization of its nuclear status, a permanent seat on
the Security Council, and international recognition of the Line of
Control as the border between India and Pakistan.
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Although not a member of the NPT, India has adhered to the
terms and conditions of the treaty insofar as they seek to prevent
the proliferation of nuclear weapons, technology, and materials.
Thus the Indian government has not transferred nuclear technology
or materials to other states and reportedly refused to sell nuclear
weapons to Libya. Yet ofﬁcial U.S. policy, and indeed that of the
other established nuclear weapons states, remains one of asking
India to rollback its nuclear weapons program and sign the NPT.
The American position of adhering to legal technicalities rather
than accepting the nuclear reality in South Asia hurts India’s nuclear
weapons program, undermines its security, and prevents India from
rising to its perceived international status. Given the U.S. role as
the remaining superpower and its leadership in nonproliferation
initiatives, it is imperative to start a change of ofﬁcial policy in
Washington.
The general consensus is that the NPT is set in stone and that the
presence of arms control supporters in various branches of the U.S.
Government makes it difﬁcult to change this policy. Yet such a belief
goes against the actions the United States has taken in reshaping, or
moving away from, treaties written during the Cold War. Thus the
Bush administration decided to walk out of the Anti-Ballistic Missile
(ABM) treaty and instead go ahead with the development of a
NMD capability. Despite dire warnings about the consequences, the
American action actually elicited no strident and aggressive response
from Russia. Similarly, the Bush administration decided to move
beyond the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) negotiations
and call for deep cuts in the existing nuclear weapons inventories. It
is not inconceivable, therefore, that the Bush administration could
consider a revision of the NPT to include the three de facto nuclear
states that were left out of the original treaty.
A realistic appraisal would suggest that bringing India, Israel,
and Pakistan into the nuclear club has advantages, particularly in the
attempts to halt the further spread of nuclear weapons. As members
of the club, the three countries would have to abide by the rules of
membership, which include the refusal to transfer technology and
materials.73 Further, it would permit the legal transfer of technologies
like PALs, at least in the case of Pakistan, would help increase
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the security and safety of these arsenals. It is also in India’s interests
to ensure that the Pakistani nuclear arsenal was secure since it would
reduce the risk of an accidental or unauthorized launch of these
weapons.
Both India and Pakistan can also make the convincing argument
that the knowledge that their nuclear weapons are secure from
international censure makes it possible for them to be more
transparent in their dealings with each other and with the greater
international community.
The second Indian objective is to attain a permanent seat on
the Security Council since this provides formal acceptance of the
country’s status as a nuclear power and as a major actor in the
international system. India has succeeded in getting Britain, Japan,
Germany, Russia, and even China to endorse its case. The United
States remains opposed to this proposal. There are advantages to the
greater international community in Indian inclusion in the Security
Council. India has diplomatic links with nations like Iran, Syria,
and Libya that, while having rocky relations with the international
community, are important to any long-term solution of regional
disputes. Further, Indian peacekeeping and peace enforcement
capabilities make it a good partner in the quest to maintain regional
security and deal with problem of reestablishing order in failed states.
A permanent seat in the Security Council would not only give India
the encouragement to act more proactively in the quest to maintain
international peace and security, but it would also provide greater
legitimacy to Indian initiatives in this process.
The third objective must be to get the United States to ofﬁcially
declare its support for the Line of Control as the ofﬁcial border
between India and Pakistan. It is stating the obvious that until India
is no longer immersed in the India-Pakistan dispute, it will be unable
to carry out effectively its policies in the rest of the world. An India
that has a less hostile relationship with Pakistan also becomes more
attractive to investors, particularly if it means using the economic
advantages provided by the geographical linkages between the two
countries. Pipelines from Central Asia and Iran make the most sense
if they can come through Pakistan to the large energy market that is
India.
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Potentially, this is not a position that the White House would
be averse to taking. In the Arab-Israeli context, it has advocated a
two state solution, but one that would require moving away from
established UN resolutions to a more pragmatic approach that
recognizes the realities on the ground. Further, the legalization of the
LOC helps reduce tensions between two nuclear rivals and thus does
not complicate American efforts in the War on Terror. Legitimizing
the LOC also makes a statement in the global War on Terrorism―
that the international community will not reward terrorist actions.
While this may be the weakest point to make, given the American
focus on anti-American terrorist organizations, it has relevance in
sending a clear signal to other terrorist groups about the value of
violent actions in precipitating political change.
The question then arises, why would any American administration
agree to even consider the Indian policy objectives? The answer lies
in the greater problems the United States faces in the pursuit of its
post-9/11 international security policy. Manpower shortages, an
expanding global battleﬁeld, and a potential resource crunch make
the prosecution of the War on Terror increasingly difﬁcult. These
constraints are felt not only in the short-term objective of destroying
terrorist networks and regime change, but also in the more long-term
and problematic issue of nation-building. For both such objectives,
India has the trained manpower to be an ally in constructing a more
secure world.
In any such arrangement, Indian concerns about deploying troops
and using military force will, however, have to be accommodated.
Any Indian government would require the legitimacy provided by
resolutions from international organizations like the UN or from
regional organizations like the African Union. Thus India readily
provided naval vessels to ensure maritime security for the 2003
African Union summit.74 Similarly, the Indian Navy will work
alongside its Singaporean, Thai, and Filipino counterparts to check
piracy, weapons, narcotics trafﬁcking, and other maritime threats.75
On the other hand, India backed down from providing troops for the
Iraq war because of the lack of a UN mandate.
The other aspect of peacekeeping and peace enforcement is the
need to give diplomatic efforts a better chance at succeeding and,
as mentioned earlier, India has the ability to serve as a facilitator in
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discussions with several national regimes that the United States has
major problems with. The United States has traditionally depended
on its NATO allies and Japan for this type of role but, as the Chinese
role in getting North Korea to the multiparty talks shows, new allies
can be equally effective. India could, therefore, offer its good ofﬁces to
help engage the United States in new discussions with, for example,
Iran.
A complementary security worldview on Asia would also help
build the Indian case to secure its objectives. Maritime security
efforts that began with the escort of American naval vessels can
now be expanded to create a maritime security framework for Asia
that attempts to counter threats that all states face―piracy, weapons
trafﬁcking, and the transport of illegal narcotics―and are, therefore,
least controversial. If India were to take the ﬁrst step to develop a
Maritime Security Cooperation Regime, this would serve as a major
contribution towards developing a common security perspective in
Asia.
In conclusion, one must, therefore, argue that there is a need for
a more proactive policy towards India that helps secure its national
objectives and, in doing so, makes it easier to attain broader U.S.
goals.
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